Empiricism and Theorizing in Epidemiology and Social Network Analysis by Rothenberg, Richard & Costenbader, Elizabeth
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases
Volume 2011, Article ID 157194, 5 pages
doi:10.1155/2011/157194
Commentary
Empiricismand TheorizinginEpidemiologyand Social
Network Analysis
Richard Rothenberg1 andElizabeth Costenbader2
1Institute of Public Health, Georgia State University, 140 Decatur Street, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA
2Family Health International, Behavioral and Social Sciences Department, 2224 E NC Hwy 54, Durham, NC 27713, USA
Correspondence should be addressed to Richard Rothenberg, rrothenberg@gsu.edu
Received 24 June 2010; Accepted 6 October 2010
Copyright © 2011 R. Rothenberg and E. Costenbader. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
The connection between theory and data is an iterative one. In principle, each is informed by the other: data provide the basis
for theory that in turn generates the need for new information. This circularity is reﬂected in the notion of abduction, a concept
that focuses on the space between induction (generating theory from data) and deduction (testing theory with data). Einstein,
in the 1920s, placed scientiﬁc creativity in that space. In the ﬁeld of social network analysis, some remarkable theory has been
developed, accompanied by sophisticated tools to develop, extend, and test the theory. At the same time, important empirical
data have been generated that provide insight into transmission dynamics. Unfortunately, the connection between them is often
tenuousandtheiterativeloopisfrayed.Thiscircumstancemayarisebothfromdatadeﬁciencies andfromtheeasewithwhichdata
can be created by simulation. But for whatever reason, theory and empirical data often occupy diﬀerent orbits. Fortunately, the
relationship, while frayed, is not broken, to which several recent analyses merging theory and extant data will attest. Their further
rapprochement in the ﬁeld of social network analysis could provide the ﬁeld with a more creative approach to experimentation
and inference.
1.Introduction
Theory and empirical data are in principle intimately
interwoven. Yet in the practice of social network analysis,
there appears to be a disconnect: theorizing and empiricism
often seem to occupy separate orbits, and these separate
discussions may be diﬃcult to relate to each other. The root
of the problem may lie in the diﬀerent skill sets required by
each, or perhaps in the substantial obstacles to collection
of human network data. The following exploration of the
distance between theory and empiricism suggests that a
rapprochement would be of considerable beneﬁt to the
ﬁeld.
The mid-19th Century American philosopher Charles
Peirce coined the term “abduction” (which he also called
“retroduction”) to ﬁll a gap he perceived in the territory
occupied by induction and deduction. As distilled by
Professor Burch [1], Peirce used syllogisms to explain this
term, substituting Rule, Case, and Result for the more
familiar Major Premise, Minor Premise, and Conclusion.
But perhaps more interesting to epidemiologists and social
network analysts, he related this logical process to sampling.
As Professor Burch explains it, a standard valid syllogism
would progress as follows.
Rule: All balls in this urn are red.
Case: All balls in this particular random sample are taken
from this urn.
Result: Therefore, all balls in this particular random sample
are red.
Peirce then asked what would happen if we change the
orderofreasoning,byinterchangingtheResultandtheRule.
Result: All balls in this particular random sample are red.
Case: All balls in this particular random sample are taken
from this urn.
Rule: Therefore, all balls in this urn are red.
Burch points out that this is not a valid syllogism but was
the core of Peirce’s concept of induction. Extraordinary, how
closely it captures the epidemiologic mindset. But take it one
step farther, and interchange the Result with the Case.2 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases
Rule: All balls in this urn are red.
Result: All balls in this particular random sample are red.
Case: Therefore, all balls in this particular random sample
are taken from this urn.
Again, not a valid construct, but if we substitute
“Alternate Hypothesis” for “Rule,” we appear to capture the
essence of hypothesis testing as it is now practiced [2].
Burchmaintainsthatthisisneitherinductionnordeduction,
but a new type of argument that Peirce called abduction.
Peirce went on to use the three “-ductions” to describe
the scientiﬁc method as a circular synthesis of the scientiﬁc
method. The process begins with a conjecture or hypothesis
that is based on some observation or thought (abduction).
From the hypothesis can be derived consequences, and these
can be tested. The resulting test observations can be used to
conﬁrm or refute the hypothesis, or more generally, either to
draw conclusions about the truth or return to the abductive
process of conjuring up a new hypothesis.
Popper did not agree [3]. He relegated the process
of hypothesis generation to the realm of psychology and
stated overtly that he was not interested in it [3,p a g e
39]. In contrast, Albert Einstein embraced it. As described
by Adam [4], Einstein wrote a short newspaper article
in 1919 that colocated the process of abduction with the
creativity inherent in scientiﬁc endeavors. Einstein said:
“Intuitive comprehension of the essentials about the large
complex facts leads the researcher to construct one or several
hypotheticalfundamentallaws...he[theresearcher]doesnot
arrive at his system of thought in a methodical, inductive
way; rather, he snuggles (sic) to the facts by intuitive choice
among the imaginable axiomatic theories.”
Thus, Peirce and Einstein provide a direct connection
between theory, observations, conclusions, and revisions.
This view stresses that theory and observation are inter-
dependent, iterative, and connected by creativity. Unfortu-
nately,thisconnection(thoughnotnecessarilythecreativity)
seems to have attenuated in the application of social network
analysis to disease transmission.
2. The Linkage of Theory andEmpiricism
Several factors have hindered a tight linkage between the-
oretical and empirical approaches. First, the cost and time
to elucidate sociometric network structure, particularly for
hard-to-reach populations such as those who may be at the
highest risk for HIV or other communicable diseases, are
often viewed as prohibitive. Second, empirical sociometric
network ascertainment is imperfect. Since the boundaries
of the populations of interest are never known and always
changing and the manner in which we ﬁnd out about
connections is not standardized, some connections between
individuals or network nodes within those populations
are always missed, often in unknown ways that render
imputation and interpretation problematic. Third, there is
no gold standard and no true or known network against
which to measure empirical adequacy. These concerns are all
subsumed under the general issue of sampling in networks.
Because empirical ascertainment of networks requires a
credible sampling procedure, preferably one that justiﬁes
the use of standard statistical theory, observations may be
suspected. One result has been a movement toward theory-
based network simulation wherein the investigator controls
thesampling,knows(actuallycreates)thegoldstandard,and
cantesttheeﬀectofimposedconditions.Thepastdecadehas
witnessed a burgeoning of this work and considerable new
insight into the structure, function, and dynamics of many
t y p e so fn e t w o r k s[ 5, 6].
Apersistentproblem,however,isthediﬃcultyofrelating
theoretical network constructs back to some empirical real-
ity.Thetheoreticalbiasesinherentinsamplingarethecasein
point. There can be no question that sampling matters if one
istohaveacrediblemathematicalbasisforstatisticalnetwork
inference [7, 8]. Modeling approaches have demonstrated
the biases that arise from missing data [9]. In his text,
Newman [10] enumerates some of these biases: snowball
sampling ﬁnds persons in proportion to their eigenvector
centrality (i.e., the centrality of their contacts), but the
large number of waves required to reach equilibrium may
preclude unbiased estimates. Contact tracing suﬀers from
the same problem, with the additional issue of seeking only
infected persons, who are a biased sample of the population.
Random walk sampling may oﬀer some advantages, since
sampling is proportional to degree, and equilibrium can be
reached quickly in small groups, but issues of contact recall,
unﬁndable partners, and nonparticipation persist. These
assertions are all readily veriﬁable using mathematical and
simulation approaches. There has been little or no empirical
validation, however, of many theoretical conclusions that are
taken as true. In fact, the assumption of theoretical validity
is often so strong that many may ﬁnd empirical veriﬁcation
unnecessary.
3.Reconnecting Theory to Data
But if the Peirce/Einstein view is to be recaptured, meaning-
fuleﬀortsatfalsiﬁcationoftheoreticalconstructsareneeded.
As noted, such eﬀorts are generally not attempted, perhaps
because of their diﬃculty, or perhaps because of the ap r i o r i
assumptions about their inadequacy. (You cannot know if
you have the right answer, so why bother.) This is perhaps
where Peirce’s second syllogism—the balls in my random
sample are all red, so those in the urn from which they
come must be red—needs to be invoked. Though logically
defective—in fact, it epitomizes “the inductive problem”
that has concerned philosophers since Hume—it is the
basis for the inductive reasoning that, as noted, drives the
epidemiological mindset. As argued forcefully by Pearce and
Crawford-Brown [11], the notion that falsiﬁability is the
hallmark of science fails to recognize the uncertainties of
falsiﬁability, which can be at least as strong as those of
induction. In addition, these authors stress the primacy
of replication and validation of ﬁndings [12], the need
for mature theory examined in multiple ways, and the
importance of observations whose ongoing renewal and
explanation is actually the work of theory.Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases 3
Table 1: Network features with chronological accrual of respondents.
Number of respondents 10 20 30 40 50 100 150 All (206)
Number of persons in network 62 131 202 284 367 685 981 1314
Degree (mean of interviewed respondents) 7.4 8.1 8.3 8.6 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6
Degree (mean of all persons in network) 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Degree (variance) 10.5 13.4 13.1 12.8 12.5 12.1 11.8 10.9
Concurrency (kappa) 5.9 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.1
Clustering coeﬃcient 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.029 0.028 0.033 0.041 0.036
Power coeﬃcient 2.79 2.19 2.23 1.76 1.71 1.65 1.59 1.59
Age assortativity 0.313 0.299 0.348 0.315 0.285 0.329 0.323 0.319
Thus, to complete the loop of theory validation, we
require repeated demonstration that theoretical predictions
are borne out in real life. Empirical veriﬁcation of theoretical
constructs aﬃrms their validity, provides ongoing reﬁne-
ment of parameters, and furnishes a real basis for applying
interventions.Inthecurrentrealmofsocialnetworkanalysis,
it would seem that empirical studies provide parameters to
theoreticians, and not much else.
4. Some Other Examples
On the other hand, it is also the case that those involved
in delineating real-time social networks have focused more
on ﬁndings and transmission implications than on the
speciﬁc validation of theoretical constructs. For example,
15 empirical network studies that were used in a synthesis
of ﬁndings [13] produced over 100 publications, but none
focused primarily on testing theoretical ﬁndings. There
are some examples, however, of empirical attempts to
examinetheoreticalconstructs.Take,forexample,Newman’s
assertion that, with random walk sampling, equilibrium
can be reached quickly in small groups. Two empirical
observations speak to this issue. First, in a direct test of
sampling methods [14], networks ascertained by a chain
link random walk (wherein the next person in the chain
was chosen at random from the contacts of the current
respondent) or by nomination (the next person in the chain
nominated by the respondent from his/her contacts) were
indistinguishable. Second, using those same networks, the
underlying pattern of network conﬁguration was evident
fromtheﬁrst10interviews(outof206)(Table 1),supporting
the notion that the pattern becomes clear quickly.
In a comparison of centrality measures [15], it was
demonstrated that imperfect sample data produced stable
network estimates under a variety of circumstances. In
a comparison of eight types of centrality measures, high
concordance [16] was found among measures ascertained
through a complex, mixed sampling scheme despite expec-
tations that these measures would vary because of their
diﬀering relationships to the underlying sampling method.
A number of studies, following the observations by
Barab´ asi and colleagues of “scale-free” network structure
in the world wide web [17–19], attempted to show that
networks of persons at risk for HIV and STIs could be
ﬁt by a power law curve with a coeﬃcient between 2 and
3 (the statistical requirement for scale-freeness) [13, 20].
Several rigorous statistical analyses [7, 21] of the empirical
data from 10 studies found that none of the nine statistical
models tested consistently provided the best ﬁt to the degree
distributions from those studies. In addition, the best-ﬁt
power law model predicted no epidemic threshold for HIV
and STIs in the United States, a theoretical observation
in obvious contrast to the true condition. This result
[21], by providing empirical evidence against the proposed
theory, embodies the aforementioned process of “circular
synthesis.”
As a ﬁnal example, the history of concurrency as an
important feature of HIV and STD transmission is informa-
tive. Though disjointed, and at times acerbic, the discussion
has gone back and forth between theory and data and
provides a good illustration of how the two interact. The role
of concurrency in Africa was ﬁrst suggested nearly 20 years
ago, based both on observation [22, 23] and on theoretical
considerations and simulation [24]. In a comprehensive
followup [25–27], mathematical development of a simple
formula for calculating network concurrency and a simple
simulation established the importance of concurrency in
transmission. Ten years on, extensive claims have been made
for the overriding importance of concurrency in sexual
transmission of HIV in Africa [28, 29], with the assertion
that multiple sites, assessed in multiple ways, have evidence
of substantial concurrency. Though the empirical evidence
for these claims has been challenged [30, 31], and the
challenge contested [32], the pattern of high long-term
concurrency with a relatively low degree distribution has
been demonstrated in detail in at least one comprehensive
study, in Likoma Island, Malawi [33]. This nonlinear chain
of events does nonetheless illustrate the importance of the
interplay between conjecture, empirical data, and theoretical
development. The next step, not yet completed, would be
a theoretical demonstration of rapid epidemic spread in an
African setting that would incorporate a low-degree high
concurrency conﬁguration and reasonable parameters for
transmission based on emerging empirical information on
infectivity in acute HIV infection [34]. (In another aspect
of concurrency—its potential role in explaining the ethnic
disparity in HIV infection in the United States—this type
of theoretical and empirical interplay has been attempted to
conﬁrm its importance [35].)4 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Infectious Diseases
5.InterlockingRoles
Though there are other examples of the circular process
of empirical and theoretical interaction, they are still few
in number. The majority of empirical studies (e.g., large-
scale surveys) from which parameters are drawn are usually
theory-free. In turn, theoretical and simulation studies, as
noted, use these parameters but are often data- and context-
free.(Anunfaircharacterization,perhaps,butitisdiﬃcultto
deny that ethnographers generally do not speak mathematics
and mathematicians do not speak the language of the
street.)
But from these considerations, a clearer role for theory,
empiricism, and their interrelationship may emerge. In his
Nobel acceptance speech in 1974, Frederich von Hayek,
often called the father of complexity theory, said: “...as we
penetratefromtherealminwhichrelatively simple lawsprevail
[the physical sciences] into the range of phenomena where
organized complexity rules...often all that we shall be able to
predict will be some abstract characteristic of the pattern that
will appear...yet...we will still achieve predictions which can
be falsiﬁed and which therefore are of empirical signiﬁcance”
[36]. Despite all their diﬃculties, empirical descriptions
of networks, both qualitative and quantitative, have the
potential to ﬁnd those abstract characteristics of a pattern,
a task for which theoretical and simulation studies alone
are not well suited. Theoretical studies are well suited to
exploring patterns, and they often do it best in ways that
make little pretense of reality [37] but are geared rather to
demonstrating mechanisms and testing the observations. A
greater synergy between theory and data could provide the
ﬁeld with a more systematic approach to experimentation
and inference.
Fortunately the process of abduction is a method equally
approachable by all scientists. Theoreticians can be just as
good abductors as empiricists. Anyone is at liberty to think
up ideas, but those who “snuggle to the facts” may have the
best chance of success.
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